Regulations, Codes & Standards (RCS)

According to European Directive 2014/94/EU hydrogen providers have the responsibility to prove that their hydrogen is of suitable quality for fuel cell vehicles. Contaminants may originate from hydrogen production transportation refuelling station or maintenance operation. This study investigated the probability of presence of the 13 gaseous contaminants (ISO 14687-2) in hydrogen on 3 production processes: steam methane reforming (SMR) process with pressure swing adsorption (PSA) chlor-alkali membrane electrolysis process and water proton exchange membrane electrolysis process with temperature swing adsorption. The rationale behind the probability of contaminant presence according to process knowledge and existing barriers is highlighted. No contaminant was identified as possible or frequent for the three production processes except oxygen (frequent for chlor-alkali membrane process) carbon monoxide (frequent) and nitrogen (possible) for SMR with PSA. Based on it a hydrogen quality assurance plan following ISO 19880-8 can be devised to support hydrogen providers in monitoring the relevant contaminants.

The NASA Safety Standard which establishes a uniform process for hydrogen system design materials selection operation storage and transportation is presented. The guidelines include suggestions for safely storing handling and using hydrogen in gaseous (GH2) liquid (LH2) or slush (SLH2) form whether used as a propellant or non-propellant. The handbook contains 9 chapters detailing properties and hazards facility design design of components materials compatibility detection and transportation. Chapter 10 serves as a reference and the appendices contained therein include: assessment examples; scaling laws explosions blast effects and fragmentation; codes standards and NASA directives; and relief devices along with a list of tables and figures abbreviations a glossary and an index for ease of use. The intent of the handbook is to provide enough information that it can be used alone but at the same time reference data sources that can provide much more detail if required.

The aim of this project was to review the current purge standards for UK domestic installations in particular IGEM/UP/1B and carry out experiments to assess the validity of those standards for use in hydrogen in order to understand and recommend safe purge practices for hydrogen in a domestic environment.

This report provides the results and conclusions relating to the relative safety of purging domestic installations to hydrogen compared to Natural Gas and the implications of releasing any purged gas

into an enclosed volume representing a small room.

The two high-level findings from this work are:

• changeover to hydrogen will result in an increased risk of flammability inside the installation pipework
• changeover to hydrogen will result in a reduced risk of a build-up of flammable gas in any room where purging occurs.

This work recognises a number of important differences between hydrogen and methane. Hydrogen is more flammable than methane in air particularly at high concentrations. Hydrogen can maintain a flame at 4% but does not support general three dimensional deflagration until about 8.5%. Above about 18% given increased obstruction within the combustion zone or passage of the flame along a pipe the deflagration can transition to detonation. The flame speed suddenly increases to ~2000m/s. It is very important to avoid this situation although the inventory in a domestic pipe is low. This risk of detonation can occur at concentrations up to 59% and the risk of deflagration remains to 75 %.Methane behaves very differently to this with a range of deflagration of about 4.8 to 16% and a detonation range only marginally narrower. Initiating detonation is however much more difficult with methane.

The risks with hydrogen are associated with a wide range of flammability with methane the risks are smaller and mainly in lower concentrations of gas in air. Because of this it is particularly important to ensure hydrogen pipes are appropriately purged.

The permitting process for hydrogen fueling stations varies from country to country. However a common step in the permitting process is the demonstration that the proposed fueling station meets certain safety requirements. Currently many permitting authorities rely on compliance with well known codes and standards as a means to permit a facility. Current codes and standards for hydrogen facilities require certain safety features specify equipment made of material suitable for hydrogen environment and include separation or safety distances. Thus compliance with the code and standard requirements is widely accepted as evidence of a safe design. However to ensure that a hydrogen facility is indeed safe the code and standard requirements should be identified using a risk-informed process that utilizes an acceptable level of risk. When compliance with one or more code or standard requirements is not possible an evaluation of the risk associated with the exemptions to the requirements should be understood and conveyed to the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). Establishment of a consistent risk assessment toolset and associated data is essential to performing these risk evaluations. This paper describes an approach for risk-informing the permitting process for hydrogen fueling stations that relies primarily on the establishment of risk-informed codes and standards. The proposed risk-informed process begins with the establishment of acceptable risk criteria associated with the operation of hydrogen fueling stations. Using accepted Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) techniques and the established risk criteria the minimum code and standard requirements necessary to ensure the safe operation of hydrogen facilities can be identified. Risk informed permitting processes exist in some countries and are being developed in others. To facilitate consistent risk-informed approaches the participants in the International Energy Agency (IEA) Task 19 on hydrogen safety are working to identify acceptable risk criteria QRA models and supporting data.

The widescale distribution of hydrogen through gas networks is promoted as a viable and cost-efficient option for optimising its application in heat industry and transport. It is a key step towards achieving decarbonisation targets in the UK. A key consideration before the injection of hydrogen into the UK gas networks is an assessment of the difference in hydrogen contaminants presence from different production methods. This information is essential for gas regulation and for further purification requirements. This study investigates the level of ISO 14687 Grade D contaminants in hydrogen from steam methane reforming proton exchange membrane water electrolysis and alkaline electrolysis. Sampling and analysis of hydrogen were carried out by the National Physical Laboratory following ISO 21087 guidance. The results of analysis indicated the presence of nitrogen in hydrogen from electrolysis and water carbon dioxide and particles in all samples analysed. The contaminants were at levels below or at the threshold limits set by ISO 14687 Grade D. This indicates that the investigated production methods are not a source of contaminants for the eventual utilisation of hydrogen in different applications including fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV’s). The gas network infrastructure will require a similar analysis to determine the likelihood of contamination to hydrogen gas.

Under government funded project: "Development for Safe Utilization and Infrastructure of Hydrogen" entrusted by New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) special material testing equipment with heavy walled pressure vessel under 45MPa gaseous hydrogen is facilitated. Tensile properties strain controlled low-cycle and high-cycle fatigue and fatigue crack growth tests on CrMo steel (SCM435 (JIS G 4105)) which will be applied for the storage gas cylinders in Japanese hydrogen fuel stations are investigated. The results of the tensile tests under 45MPa ultra high purity hydrogen gas (O2<1ppm) at room temperature shows that there are no difference in yield and maximum tensile strength with those tested in air. However the reduced ductilities with brittle fracture surface were observed which indicates the occurrence of hydrogen environment embrittlement. It was also found by tensile tests that the embrittling origin is not only caused by machined traces on surface but also by the non-metallic inclusions dispersed on surface. Further discussions on surface treatment effects will be presented. In low cycle fatigue tests considerable reductions in cycles to failure in 45MPa ultra high purity hydrogen gas were observed. However there are tendencies that the effect of hydrogen environment embrittlement becomes not so significant as the plastic strain range decreases. It was demonstrated that there was no effect of hydrogen on fatigue limit and this implies that CrMo gas cylinders can be operated in limited fatigue safe condition. Another series of hydrogen test results temperature effect fatigue crack growth rate delayed fracture test using wedge opening loaded specimens and fatigue test of CrMo gas cylinders under repeated internal pressure with artificial crack will be presented.

Automated and electric mass transit will play a significant role in the connectivity of our cities and regions. But automated mass transit must be placed within the wider context of the optimum transport needs of those cities and regions— transport networks based on shared and multi-modal mobility. Realising the full potential of these networks will require sustained policy development and investment.<br/>This report examines current and future developments in the use of automation and new energy sources in land-based mass transit including rail and road mass transit point-to-point transport using automated vehicles and the role and responsibilities of the Commonwealth in the development of these technologies. It will analyse the opportunities and challenges presented by automation and new energy sources and the role the Australian Government has to play in managing this transport revolution.

The HYPER project a specific targeted research project (STREP) funded by the European Commission under the Sixth Framework Programme developed an Installation Permitting Guide (IPG) for hydrogen and fuel cell stationary applications. The IPG was developed in response to the growing need for guidance to foster the use and facilitate installation of these systems in Europe. This document presents a modified version of the IPG specifically intended for the UK market. For example reference is made to UK national regulations standards and practices when appropriate as opposed to European ones.<br/>The IPG applies to stationary systems fuelled by hydrogen incorporating fuel cell devices with net electrical output of up to 10 kWel and with total power outputs of the order of 50 kW (combined heat + electrical) suitable for small back up power supplies residential heating combined heat-power (CHP) and small storage systems. Many of the guidelines appropriate for these small systems will also apply to systems up to 100 kWel which will serve small communities or groups of households. The document is not a standard but is a compendium of useful information for a variety of users with a role in installing these systems including design engineers manufacturers architects installers operators/maintenance workers and regulators.<br/>This report and the work it describes were funded by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Its contents including any opinions and/or conclusions expressed are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect HSE policy.

"Hydrogen is expected to play a critical role in the move to a net-zero economy. However large-scale deployment is still in its infancy and there is still much to be done before we can blend hydrogen in large volumes into gas networks and ramp up the production that is required to meet demands of the energy transport and industry sectors. KTN Global Alliance will host two webinars to explore these challenges and opportunities in hydrogen blending on the 2nd and 3rd March 2021.



Exciting pilot projects are being conducted and explored in the UK Canada and US states such as California to determine the technical feasibility of blending hydrogen into existing natural gas systems. Whilst the deployment of hydrogen is in its early stages there is increasing interest around permitting significant percentage blends of hydrogen into gas networks which would enable the carbon intensity of gas supplies to be reduced creating a new demand for hydrogen and with the use of separation and purification technologies downstream support the transportation of pure hydrogen to markets.

Gaps in codes and standards need to be addressed to enable adoption and there may be opportunities for international collaboration and harmonisation to ensure that best practices are shared globally and to facilitate the growth of trade and export markets. There is an opportunity for the UK Canada and US three G7 countries to work together and show market making leadership in key enabling regulation for the new hydrogen economy.



Delivered by KTN Global Alliance on behalf of the British Consulate-General in Vancouver and the UK Science and Innovation Network in Canada and the US these two webinars will showcase hydrogen blending pilot projects in the UK Canada and California highlighting challenges and opportunities with regard to standards development for hydrogen blending and supporting further transatlantic collaboration in this area. The events also form part of the UK’s international engagement to build momentum towards a successful outcome at COP26 the UN climate summit that the UK will host in Glasgow in November 2021. The webinars will bring together experts from industry academia and policy from the UK Canada and California. Attendees will have an opportunity to ask questions and interact using Mentimeter."











Part 2 Highlights and Perspectives from Canada and California can be found here.

The UK Government signed legislation on 27th June 2019 committing the UK to a legally binding target of Net Zero emissions by 2050. Climate change is one of the most significant technical economic social and business challenges facing the world today.

The H21 NIC Phase 1 project delivered an optimally designed experimentation and testing programme supported by the HSE Science Division and DNV GL with the aim to collect quantifiable evidence to support that the UK distribution network of 2032 will be comparably as safe operating on 100% hydrogen as it currently is on

natural gas. This innovative project begins to fill critical safety evidence gaps surrounding the conversion of the UK gas network to 100% hydrogen. This will facilitate progression towards H21 Phase 2 Operational Safety Demonstrations and the H21 Phase 3 Live Trials to promote customer acceptability and ultimately aid progress towards a government policy decision on heat.

DNV GL and HSE Science Division were engaged to undertake the experimentation testing and QRA update programme of work. DNV GL and HSE Science Division also peer reviewed each other’s programme of work at various stages throughout the project undertaking a challenge and review of the experimental data and results to provide confidence in the conclusions.

A strategic set of tests was designed to cover the range of assets represented across the Great Britain gas distribution networks. The assets used in the testing were mostly recovered from the distribution network as part of the ongoing Iron Mains Risk Reduction Replacement Programme. Controlled testing against a well-defined master testing plan with both natural gas and 100% hydrogen was then undertaken to provide the quantitative evidence to forecast any change to background leakage levels in a 100% hydrogen network.

Key Findings from Phase 1a:

• Of the 215 assets tested 41 of them were found to leak 19 of them provided sufficient data to be able to compare hydrogen and methane leak rates.
• The tests showed that assets that were gas tight on methane were also gas tight on hydrogen. Assets that leaked on hydrogen also leaked
• on methane including repaired assets.
• The ratio of the hydrogen to methane volumetric leak rates varied between 1.1 and 2.2 which is largely consistent with the bounding values expected for laminar and turbulent (or inertial) flow which gave ratios of 1.2 and 2.8 respectively.
• None of the PE assets leaked; cast ductile and spun iron leaked to a similar degree (around 26-29% of all iron assets leaked) and the proportion of leaking steel assets was slightly less (14%).
• Four types of joint were responsible for most of the leaks on joints: screwed lead yarn bolted gland and hook bolts.
• All of the repairs that sealed methane leaks also were effective when tested with hydrogen.