Safety

The use of hydrogen storage tanks at 100% of nominal working pressure (NWP) is expected only after refuelling. Driving between refuellings is characterised by the state of charge SoC <100%. There is experimental evidence that Type IV tanks tested in a fire at initial pressures below 1/3 NWP leaked without rupture. This paper aims at understanding this phenomenon. The numerical research has demonstrated that the heat transfer from fire through the composite overwrap at storage pressures below NWP/3 is sufficient to melt the polymer liner. This melting initiates hydrogen microleaks through the composite before it loses the load-bearing ability. The fire-resistance rating (FRR) is defined as the time to rupture in a fire of a tank without or with blocked thermally activated pressure relief device. The dependence of a FRR on the SoC is demonstrated for the tanks with defined material properties and volumes in the range of 36–244 L. A composite wall thickness variation is shown to cause a safety issue by reducing the tank’s FRR and is suggested to be addressed by tank manufacturers and OEMs. The effect of a tank’s burst pressure ratio on the FRR is investigated. Thermal parameters of the composite wall i.e. decomposition heat and temperatures are shown in simulations of a tank failure in a fire to play an important role in its FRR.

Governments and other stakeholders actively promote and facilitate the development and deployment of hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. Various strategy documents and energy forecasts outline the environmental and societal benefits of the prospective hydrogen economy. At the same time the safety related properties of hydrogen imply that it is not straightforward to achieve and document the same level of safety for hydrogen systems compared to conventional fuels. Severe accidents can have major impact on the development of energy technologies. The stakes will increase significantly as the use of hydrogen shifts from controlled environments in industrial facilities to the public domain and as the transport-related consumption extends from passenger cars and buses to trains ships and airplanes. Widespread deployment of hydrogen as an energy carrier in society will require massive investments. This implies commercial and political commitment involvement and influence on research priorities and decision-making. The legacy from accidents and the messages communicated by influential stakeholders impact not only how the public perceives hydrogen technologies but also governmental policies the development of regulations codes and standards (RCS) and ultimately the measures adopted for preventing and mitigating accidents. This paper explores whether and how selected aspects of safety are considered when distinct groups of stakeholders frame the hydrogen economy. We assess to what extent the communication is consistent with the current state-of-the-art in hydrogen safety and the contemporary strength of knowledge in risk assessments for hydrogen systems. The approach adopted entails semi-quantitative text analysis and close reading to highlight variations between diverse groups of stakeholders. The results indicate a bias in the framing of the safety-related aspects of the hydrogen economy towards procedural organisational and societal measures of risk reduction at the expense of well-known challenges and knowledge gaps associated with the implications of fundamental safety-related properties of hydrogen.

Predicting lower flammability limits (LFL) of hydrogen has become an ever-important task for safety of nuclear industry. While numerous experimental studies have been conducted LFL results applicable for the harsh environment are still lack of information. Our aim is to develop a calculated non-adiabatic flame temperature (CNAFT) model to better predict LFL of hydrogen mixtures in nuclear power plant. The developed model is unique for incorporating radiative heat loss during flame propagation using the CNAFT coefficient derived through previous studies of flame propagation. Our new model is more consistent with the experimental results for various mixtures compared to the previous model which relied on calculated adiabatic flame temperature (CAFT) to predict the LFL without any consideration of heat loss. Limitation of the previous model could be explained clearly based on the CNAFT coefficient magnitude. The prediction accuracy for hydrogen mixtures at elevated initial temperatures and high helium content was improved substantially. The model reliability was confirmed for H2-air mixtures up to 300 C and H2-air-He mixtures up to 50 vol % helium concentration. Therefore the CNAFT model developed based on radiation heat loss is expected as the practical method for predicting LFL in hydrogen risk analysis.

For achieving Net Zero-aims hydrogen is an indispensable component probably the main component. For the usage of hydrogen a wide acceptance is necessary which requires trust in hydrogen based on absence of major incidents resulting from a high safety level. Burst tests stand for a type of testing that is used in every test standard and regulation as one of the key issues for ensuring safety in use. The central role of burst and proof test is grown to historical reasons for steam engines and steel vessels but - with respect for composite pressure vessels (CPVs) - not due an extraordinary depth of outcomes. Its importance results from the relatively simple test process with relatively low costs and gets its importance by running of the different test variations in parallel. In relevant test und production standards (as e. g. ECE R134) the burst test is used in at least 4 different meanings. There is the burst test on a) new CPVs and some others b) for determining the residual strength subsequent to various simulations of ageing effects. Both are performed during the approval process on a pre-series. Then there is c) the batch testing during the CPVs production and finally d) the 100% proof testing which means to stop the burst test at a certain pressure level. These different aspects of burst tests are analysed and compared with respect to its importance for the resulting safety of the populations of CPVs in service based on experienced test results and Monte-Carlo simulations. As main criterial for this the expected failure rate in a probabilistic meaning is used. This finally ends up with recommendations for relevant RC&S especially with respect to GTR 13."

Magnesium alloys have been widely studied as materials for temporary implants but their use has been limited by their corrosion rate. Recently coatings have been proven to provide an effective barrier. Though only little explored in the field Atomic Layer Deposition (ALD) stands out as a coating technology due to the outstanding film conformality and density achievable. Here we provide first insights into the corrosion behavior and the induced biological response of 100 nm thick ALD TiO₂ HfO₂ and ZrO₂ coatings on AZ31 alloy by means of potentiodynamic polarization curves electrochemical impedance spectroscopy (EIS) hydrogen evolution and MTS colorimetric assay with L929 cells. All three coatings improve the corrosion behavior and cytotoxicity of the alloy. Particularly HfO₂ coatings were characterized by the highest corrosion resistance and cell viability slightly higher than those of ZrO₂ coatings. TiO2 was characterized by the lowest corrosion improvements and though generally considered a biocompatible coating was found to not meet the demands for cellular applications (it was characterized by grade 3 cytotoxicity after 5 days of culture). These results reveal a strong link between biocompatibility and corrosion resistance and entail the need of taking the latter into consideration in the choice of a biocompatible coating to protect degradable Mg-based alloys.

Regarding the problem of hydrogen diffusion of the fuel cell vehicle (HFCV) when its hydrogen supply system leaks this research uses the FLUENT software to simulate numerical values in the process of hydrogen leakage diffusion in both open space and closed space. This paper analyzed the distribution range and concentration distribution characteristics of hydrogen in these two different spaces. Besides this paper also took a survey about the effects of leakage rate wind speed wind direction in open space and the role the air vents play on hydrogen safety in closed space which provides a reference for the hydrogen safety of HFCV. In conclusion the experiment result showed that: In open space hydrogen leakage rate has a great influence on its diffusion. When the leakage rate doubles the hydrogen leakage range will expand about 1.5 times simultaneously. The hydrogen diffusion range is the smallest when the wind blows at 90 degrees which is more conducive to hydrogen diffusion. However when the wind direction is against the direction of the leakage of hydrogen the range of hydrogen distribution is maximal. Under this condition the risk of hydrogen leakage is highest. In an enclosed space when the vent is set closest to the leakage position the volume fraction of hydrogen at each time is smaller than that at other positions so it is more beneficial to safety.

Preliminary research suggests domestic carbon monoxide detectors with an electrochemical sensor are approximately 10 -20% sensitive to hydrogen atmospheres in their factory configuration. That is the display on a carbon monoxide detector would give a carbon monoxide reading of approximately 10-20% of the concentration of hydrogen it is exposed to. Current British standards require detectors to sound an alarm within three minutes when subjected to a continuous concentration of ≥ 300 ppm CO. This would equate to a concentration of 1500-3000 ppm hydrogen in air or approximately 3.75 – 7% %LEL. The current evacuation criteria for a natural gas leak in a domestic property is 20 %LEL indicating that standard carbon monoxide detectors could be used as cheap and reliable early warning systems for hydrogen leaks. Given the wide use of carbon monoxide detectors and the affordability of the devices the use of carbon monoxide detectors for hydrogen detection is of particular interest as the UK drives towards energy decarbonisation. Experiments to determine the exact sensitivity of a range of the most common domestic carbon monoxide detectors have been completed by DNV Spadeadam Research & Testing. Determining the effects of repeated exposure to varying concentrations of hydrogen in air on the sensitivity of electrochemical sensors allows recommendations to be made on their adoption as hydrogen detectors. Changing the catalysts used within the electrochemical cell would improve the sensitivity to hydrogen however simply calibrating the sensor to report a concentration of hydrogen rather than carbon monoxide would represent no additional costs to manufacturers. Having determined the suitability of such sensors at an early stage; the technology can then be linked with other technological developments required for the change to hydrogen for domestic heating (e.g. change in metering equipment and appliances). This report finds that from five simple and widely available carbon monoxide detectors the lowest sensitivity to hydrogen measured at the concentration required to sound an alarm within three minutes was approximately 10%. It was also discovered that as the hydrogen concentration was increased over the range tested the sensitivity to hydrogen also increased. It is proposed that coupling these devices with other elements of the domestic gas system would allow actions such as remote meter isolation or automatic warning signals sent to response services would provide a reliable and inherently safe system for protecting occupants as gas networks transition to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions. In this respect it is noted that wireless linking of smoke and heat detectors for domestic application is already widely available in low-cost devices. This could be extended to CO detectors adapted for hydrogen use.

The document provides information on safety planning monitoring and reporting for the concerned hydrogen and fuel cell projects and programmes in Europe. It does not replace or contradict existing regulations which prevails under all circumstances. Neither is it meant to conflict with relevant international or national standards or to replace existing company safety policies codes and procedures. Instead this guidance document aims to assist in identifying minimum safety requirements hazards and associated risks and in generating a quality safety plan that will serve as an assisting guide for the inherently safer conduct of all work related to the development and operation of hydrogen and fuel cell systems and infrastructure. A safety plan should be revisited periodically as part of an overall effort to pay continuous and priority attention to the associated safety aspects and to account for all modifications of the considered system and its operations. Potential hazards failure mechanisms and related incidents associated with any work process or system should always be identified analysed reported (recorded in relevant knowledge databases e.g. HIAD 2.0 or HELLEN handbooks papers etc.) and eliminated or mitigated as part of sound safety planning and comprehensive hydrogen safety engineering which extends beyond the recommendations of this document. All relevant objects or aspects that may be adversely affected by a failure should be considered including low frequency high consequences events. So the general protection objective is to exclude or at least minimise potential hazards and associated risks to prevent impacts on the following:

• People. Hazards that pose a risk of injury or loss of life to people must be identified and eliminated or mitigated. A complete safety assessment considers not only those personnel who are directly involved in the work but also others who are at risk due to these hazards.
• Property. Damage to or loss of equipment or facilities must be prevented or minimised. Damage to equipment can be both the cause of incidents and the result of incidents. An equipment failure can result in collateral damage to nearby equipment and property which can then trigger additional equipment failures or even lead to additional hazards and risks e.g. through the domino effect. Effective safety planning monitoring and reporting considers and minimises serious risk of equipment and property damage.
• Environment. Damage to the environment must be prevented. Any aspect of a natural or the built environment which can be harmed due to a hydrogen system or infrastructure failure should be identified and analysed. A qualification of the failure modes resulting in environmental damage must be considered.

Hydrogen fuel cells power a range of vehicles including cars buses trucks forklifts and even trains. As fuel cell electric vehicles emit no carbon emissions and only produce water vapor as a by-product they present an attractive option for countries who are experiencing high pollution from transport. This paper presents the findings of ten focus groups and a subset of a national survey which focused specifically on use of hydrogen in the transport sector (N=948). When discussing hydrogen transport options Australian focus group participants felt that rolling out hydrogen fuel cell buses as a first step for fuel cell electric vehicle deployment would be a good way to increase familiarity with the technology. Deploying hydrogen public transport vehicles before personal vehicles was thought to be a positive way to demonstrate the safe use of hydrogen and build confidence in the technology. At the same time it was felt it would allow any issues to be ironed out before the roll out of large-scale infrastructure on a to support domestic use. Long haul trucks were also perceived to be a good idea however safety issues were raised in the focus groups when discussing these vehicles. Survey respondents also expressed positive support for the use of hydrogen fuel cell buses and long-haul trucks. They reported being happy to be a passenger in a fuel cell bus. Safety and environmental benefits remained paramount with cost considerations being the third most important issue. Respondents supportive of hydrogen technologies were most likely to report purchasing a hydrogen vehicle over other options

Study of flame acceleration and deflagration-to-detonation transition (DDT) in obstructed channels is an important subject of research for hydrogen safety. Experiments and numerical simulations of DDT in channels equipped with triangular obstacles were conducted in this work. High-speed schlieren photography and pressure records were used to study the flame shape changes flame propagation and pressure build up in the experiments. In the simulations the fully compressible reactive Navier–Stokes equations coupled with a calibrated chemical-diffusion model for stoichiometric hydrogen-oxygen mixture were solved using a high-order numerical method. The simulations were in good agreement with the experiments. The results show that the triangular obstacles significantly promote the flame acceleration and provide conditions for the occurrence of DDT. In the early stages of flame acceleration vortices are generated in the gaps between adjacent obstacles which is the main cause for the flame roll-up and distortion. A positive feedback mechanism between the combustiongenerated flow and flame propagation results in the variations of the size and velocity of vortices. The flame-vortex interactions cause flame fragmentation and consequently rapid growth in flame surface area which further lead to flame acceleration. The initially laminar flame then develops into a turbulent flame with the creation of shocks shock-flame interactions and various flame instabilities. The continuously arranged obstacles interact with shocks and flames and help to create environments in which a detonation can develop. Both flame collision and flame-shock interaction can give rise to detonation in the channels with triangular obstacles.