Safety

This paper presents a study on the Standard Operating Procedures (P.O.S.s) for the operation of the Fire Corps squads in the event of accidents with a hydrogen release fire or explosion. This study has been carried out by the Italian Working Group on the fire prevention safety issues as one of its main objectives. The Standard Operating Procedures proved to be a basic tool in order to improve the effectiveness of the Fire Corps rescue activity. The unique physical and chemical properties of the hydrogen its use without odorization and its almost invisible flame require a review of the already codified approaches to the rescue operations where conventional gases are involved. However this is only the first step; a Standard Operating Procedure puts together both the theoretical and practical experience achieved on the management of the rescue operations; therefore its arrangement is a cyclic process by nature always under continuous revision updating and improvement.

The SAE Technical Information Report (TIR) J2579 (Technical Information Report for Fuel Systems in Fuel Cell and Other Hydrogen Vehicles) has been created to address the safety performance of hydrogen storage and handling systems on vehicles. Safety qualification of the compressed hydrogen storage system is demonstrated through performance testing on prototype containment vessels. The two performance tests currently included in the SAE J2579 for evaluating unacceptable leakage and burst do not account for the potential effects of hydrogen embrittlement on structural integrity. This report describes efforts to address hydrogen embrittlement of structural metals in the framework of performance-based safety qualification. New safety qualification pathways that account for hydrogen embrittlement in the SAE J2579 include an additional pneumatic performance test using hydrogen gas or materials tests that demonstrate acceptable hydrogen embrittlement resistance of candidate structural metals.

The present paper reviews the state-of-the-art of integrated structural integrity monitoring systems applicable to hydrogen on-board applications. Storage safety and costs are key issues for the success of the hydrogen technology considered for replacing the conventional fuel systems in transport applications. An in-service health monitoring procedure for high pressure vessels would contribute to minimize the risks associated to high pressure hydrogen storage and to improve the public acceptance. Such monitoring system would also enable a reduction on design burst criteria enabling savings in material costs and weight. This paper reviews safety and maintenance requirements based on present standards for high pressure vessels. A state-of-the-art of storage media and materials for onboard storage tank is presented as well as of current European programmes on hydrogen storage technologies for transport applications including design safety and system reliability. A technological road map is proposed for the development and validation of a prototype within the framework of the Portuguese EDEN project. To ensure safety an exhaustive test procedure is proposed. Furthermore requirements of a safety on-board monitoring system is defined for filament wound hydrogen tanks.

In close cooperation with their Canadian counterparts United States public safety authorities are taking the first steps towards creating a proper infrastructure to ensure the safe use of the new hydrogen fuel cells now being introduced commercially. Currently public safety officials are being asked to permit hydrogen fuel cells for stationary power and as emergency power backups for the telecommunications towers that exist everywhere. Consistent application of the safety codes is difficult – in part because it is new – yet it is far more complex to train emergency responders to deal safely with the inevitable hydrogen incidents. The US and Canadian building and fire codes and standards are similar but not identical. The US and Canadian rules are unlikely to be useful to other nations without modification to suit different regulatory systems. However emergency responder safety training is potentially more universal. The risks strategies and tactics are unlikely to differ much by region. The Hydrogen Executive Leadership Panel (HELP) made emergency responder safety training its first priority because the transition to hydrogen depends on keeping incidents small and inoffensive and the public and responders safe from harm. One might think that advising 1.2 million firefighters and 800000 law enforcement officers about hydrogen risks is no more complicated than adding guidance to a website. One would be wrong. The term “training” has specific legal implications which may vary by state. For hazardous materials federal requirements apply. Insurance companies place training requirements on the policies they sell to fire departments including the thousands of small all-volunteer departments which may operate as private corporations. Union contracts may define training and promotions may be based on satisfactorily completed certain levels of training. Emergency responders could no sooner learn how to extinguish a<br/>hydrogen fire by reading a webpage than a person could learn to ride a bicycle by reading a book. Procedures must be learned by listening reading and then doing. Regular practice is necessary. As new hydrogen applications are commercialized additional responder training may be necessary. This highlights another obstacle emergency responders’ ability to travel distances and take the time to undergo training. Historically fire academies established adjunct instructor programs and satellite academies to bring the training to firefighters. The large well-equipped academies are typically used for specialized training. States rarely have enough instructors and instructors often must take the time to create a course outline research each point and produce a program that is informative useful and holds the attention of responders. The challenge of training emergency responders seems next to impossible but public safety authorities are asked to tackle the impossible every day and a model exists to move forward in the U.S. Over the past few years the National Association of State Fire Marshals and U.S. Department of Transportation enlisted the help of emergency responders and industry to create a standardized approach to train emergency responders to deal with pipeline incidents. A curriculum and training materials were created and more than 26000 sets have been distributed for free to public safety agencies nationwide. More than 8000 instructors have been trained to use these materials that are now part of the regular training in 23 states. Using this model HELP intends to ensure that all emergency responders are trained to address hydrogen risks. The model and the rigorous scenario analysis and review used to developing the operational and technical training is addressed in this paper.

Hydrogen technology requires efficient and safe hydrogen storage systems. For this purpose storage in solid materials such as high capacity complex hydrides is studied intensely. Independent from the actual material to be used eventually any tank design will combine nanoscale powders of highly reactive material with pressurized hydrogen gas and so far little is known about the behaviour of these mixtures in case of incidents. For a first evaluation of a complex hydride in case of a tank failure NaAlH4 (doped with Ti) was investigated in a small scale tank failure tests. 80-100 ml of the material were filled into a heat exchanger tube and sealed under argon atmosphere with a burst disk. Subsequently the NaAlH4 was partially desorbed by heating. When the powder temperature reached 130 °C and the burst disk ruptured at 9 bar hydrogen overpressure the behaviour of the expelled powder was monitored using a high speed camera an IR camera as well as sound level meters. Expulsion of the hydrogen storage material into (dry) ambient atmosphere yields a dust cloud of finely dispersed powder which does not ignite spontaneously. Similar experiments including an external source of ignition (spark / water reacting with NaAlH4) yield a flame of reacting powder. The intensity will be compared to the reaction of an equivalent amount of pure hydrogen.

The permitting process for hydrogen fueling stations varies from country to country. However a common step in the permitting process is the demonstration that the proposed fueling station meets certain safety requirements. Currently many permitting authorities rely on compliance with well known codes and standards as a means to permit a facility. Current codes and standards for hydrogen facilities require certain safety features specify equipment made of material suitable for hydrogen environment and include separation or safety distances. Thus compliance with the code and standard requirements is widely accepted as evidence of a safe design. However to ensure that a hydrogen facility is indeed safe the code and standard requirements should be identified using a risk-informed process that utilizes an acceptable level of risk. When compliance with one or more code or standard requirements is not possible an evaluation of the risk associated with the exemptions to the requirements should be understood and conveyed to the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). Establishment of a consistent risk assessment toolset and associated data is essential to performing these risk evaluations. This paper describes an approach for risk-informing the permitting process for hydrogen fueling stations that relies primarily on the establishment of risk-informed codes and standards. The proposed risk-informed process begins with the establishment of acceptable risk criteria associated with the operation of hydrogen fueling stations. Using accepted Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) techniques and the established risk criteria the minimum code and standard requirements necessary to ensure the safe operation of hydrogen facilities can be identified. Risk informed permitting processes exist in some countries and are being developed in others. To facilitate consistent risk-informed approaches the participants in the International Energy Agency (IEA) Task 19 on hydrogen safety are working to identify acceptable risk criteria QRA models and supporting data.

Two key aspects of hydrogen safety are (1) incorporating data and analysis from research development and demonstration (RD&D) into the codes and standards development process; and (2) adopting and enforcing these codes and standards by state and local permitting officials. This paper describes work that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is sponsoring to address these aspects of hydrogen safety. For the first DOE is working with the automobile and energy industries to identify and address high priority RD&D to establish a sound scientific basis for requirements that are incorporated in hydrogen codes and standards. The high priority RD&D needs are incorporated and tracked in an RD&D Roadmap adopted by the Codes and Standards Technical Team of the FreedomCAR and Fuel Partnership. DOE and its national laboratories conduct critical RD&D and work with key standards and model code development organizations to help incorporate RD&D results into the codes and standards process. To address the second aspect DOE has launched an initiative to facilitate the permitting process for hydrogen fueling stations (HFS). A key element of this initiative will be a Web-based information repository a toolkit that includes information fact sheets networking charts to encourage information exchange among code officials who have permitted or are in the process of permitting HFS templates to show whether a proposed station footprint conforms to requirements in the jurisdiction and a database of requirements incorporated in key codes and standards. The information repository will be augmented by workshops for code officials and station developers in jurisdictions that are likely to have HFS in the near future.

Hydrogen has been extensively used in many industrial applications for more than 100 years including production storage transport delivery and final use. Nevertheless the goal of the hydrogen energy system implies the use of hydrogen as an energy carrier in a more wide scale and for a public not familiarised with hydrogen technologies and properties.<br/>The road to the hydrogen economy passes by the development of safe practices in the production storage distribution and use of hydrogen. These issues are essential for hydrogen insurability. We have to bear in mind that a catastrophic failure in any hydrogen project could damage the insurance public perception of hydrogen technologies at this early step of development of hydrogen infrastructures.<br/>Safety is a key issue for the development of hydrogen economy and a great international effort is being done by different stakeholders for the development of suitable codes and standards concerning safety for hydrogen technologies [1 2]. Additionally to codes and standards different studies have been done regarding safety aspects of particular hydrogen energy projects during the last years [3 4]. Most of such have been focused on hydrogen production and storage in large facilities transport delivery in hydrogen refuelling stations and utilization mainly on fuel cells for mobile and stationary applications. In comparison safety considerations for hydrogen storage in small or medium scale facilities as usual in hydrogen production plants from renewable energies have received relatively less attention.<br/>After a brief introduction to risk assessment for hydrogen facilities this paper reports an example of risk assessment of a small solar hydrogen storage system applied to the INTA Solar Hydrogen Production and Storage facility as particular case and considers a top level Preliminary Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for the identification of hazard associated to the specific characteristics of the facility.

Hydrogen stations and supply systems for public transport have been demonstrated in a number of European cities during the last four years. The first refuelling facility was put into operation in Reykjavik in April 2003. Experience from the four years of operation shows that safety related incidents are more frequent in the user interface than in the other parts of the hydrogen refuelling station (HRS). This might be expected taking into account the fact that the refuelling is manually operated and that according to industrial statistics human failures normally stand for more than 80% of all safety related incidents. On the other hand the HRS experience needs special attention since the refuelling at the existing stations is carried out by well trained personnel and that procedures and systems are followed closely. So far the quality and safety approach to hydrogen refuelling stations has been based on industrial experience. This paper addresses the challenge related to the development of safe robust and easy to operate refuelling systems. Such systems require well adapted components and system solutions as well as user procedures. The challenge to adapt the industrial based quality and safety philosophy and methodologies to new hydrogen applications and customers in the public sector is addressed. Risk based safety management and risk acceptance criteria relevant to users and third party are discussed in this context. Human factors and the use of incident reporting as a tool for continuous improvement are also addressed. The paper is based on internal development programmes for hydrogen refuelling stations in Hydro and on participation in international EU and IPHE projects such as CUTE HyFLEET:CUTE HySafe and HyApproval.

Safety-barrier diagrams have proven to be a useful tool in documenting the safety measures taken to prevent incidents and accidents in process industry. In Denmark they are used to inform the authorities and the nonexperts on safety relevant issues as safety-barrier diagrams are less complex compared to fault trees and are easy to understand. Internationally there is a growing interest in this concept with the use of so-called “bowtie” diagrams which are a special case of safety-barrier diagrams. Especially during the on-going introduction of new hydrogen technologies or applications as e.g. hydrogen refueling stations this technique is considered a valuable tool to support the communication with authorities and other stakeholders during the permitting process. Another advantage of safety-barrier diagrams is that there is a direct focus on those system elements that need to be subject to safety management in terms of design and installation operational use inspection and monitoring and maintenance. Safety-barrier diagrams support both quantitative and qualitative or deterministic approaches. The paper will describe the background and syntax of the methodology and thereafter the use of such diagrams for hydrogen technologies are demonstrated.